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ABSTRACT Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s defence industry continues to consolidate,
and this process has resulted in significant restructuring across European borders. Having
examined the post-Cold War changing economic and technological conditions in the armaments
market, the article investigates how the interplay between the defence industries’ strategies in
facing this new environment and the EU initiatives in the security realm has transformed
Europe’s defence industrial base. The implications of these changes for transatlantic industrial
relations are then analysed in the space sector. It is argued that the political economy of the
transatlantic relationship has experienced a shift of relative market power away from the US
towards Europe.
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Introduction
This article examines how the post-Cold War changing political, economic and
technological environment in Europe has transformed the structure of the European
defence market and, subsequently, how this has affected the political economy of the
transatlantic relationship. To do so, we first analyse the post-Cold War trends that acted
as major drivers of the consolidation process: reduction of defence budgets; spiralling
costs of weapons systems; the ‘revolution in military affairs’; and the emergence of
American industrial giants in the 1990s. We then illustrate how the interactions between
the defence industries’ response to these trends and the national and supranational
political initiatives at the European level have changed the structure of Europe’s defence
industry from a large number of small, distinct contractors to a continent-wide industrial
base dominated by a few major defence companies. Finally, we assess the extent to
which the consolidation of the European space sector – where it has been the most far
reaching – has influenced transatlantic industrial relations. It is argued that, within this
sector, the post-Cold War consolidation process has produced two major European
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players – EADS Astrium and Thales Alenia Space – that have been able to gradually
erode US pre-eminence in the market.
Post Cold-War Economic and Technological Environment
Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the traditional model of a defence company was
primarily a nationally based firm whose primary objective was to meet the requirements of
national armed forces (O’Keefe, 1998). By completely changing conditions in the
armaments market, the economic, financial and technological challenges of the post-Cold
War era have radically transformed that model. These movements have gradually extended
firms beyond borders, turning international cooperation into true transnational integration.
The major trends in the post-Cold War defence markets can be traced as follows.
Reduced Defence Budgets
Since the end of the Cold War, the four countries which had traditionally had the major
defence expenditures on the European continent – United Kingdom, France, Germany and
Italy – have cut their defence budgets considerably. Comparison with the situation in the
United States highlights the significance of European reductions: the Americans have also
made a large cut in their defence expenditure, but it none the less remains very much
higher than that of the Europeans. Furthermore, in the US a major increase in the military
expenditure followed the 9/11 attacks (Guay, 2005). As Figure 1 shows, the same policy
did not occur in the major European states.
Figure 1. National military expenditure. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
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The reduction of the defence budgets of the traditionally major defence spenders in
Europe, by contracting aggregate demand for the defence contractors, has provided a
strong boost for industrial concentration (Kenny, 1999).
Spiralling Costs
Though the rise in the development costs of weapons systems that are ever more
sophisticated and complex is not a new phenomenon – it goes back at least to the time
of the arms race during the Cold War – it has continued despite the end of the bipolar
confrontation. This competition not only for quantity but also quality, which involves a
search for technological superiority, has led to a massive rise in the cost of
programmes. These spiralling costs have been a major incentive towards consolidation
given the necessity to reach a critical size to sustain these substantial financial
investments (Laird, 1999).
Revolution in Military Affairs
Strategic thinking is today largely dominated by the ‘revolution in military affairs’
(RMA). The RMA – which can be defined as the application of modern information
and communications technology to warfare – has had a deep impact on the defence
industry (Grant, 1999; Murawiec, 1998). RMA-related systems are based on the
combination of electronics, information and telecommunications. The most innovative
contributions come from sectors on the periphery of the traditional defence industry,
such as telecommunications, electronics, optronics and aerospace. It is the latter that
have become the true strategic sectors and the heart of the modern armaments industry
(Guay, 1998). It is in fact becoming increasingly difficult to define ‘defence industries’
strictu sensu. Technological and industrial trends are blurring the distinction between
defence and other industries, such as electronics, information technology and space
facilities. This is bound to “broaden the opportunity for linkages and alliances between
defence and non-defence companies” and has therefore further increased the room for
manoeuvre for consolidation. (Hayward, 1999, p. 10). This has further increased the
room for manoeuvre for consolidation.
The New American Giants
Between 1993 and 1997, a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the United States
produced aerospace and defence giants with turnovers several times greater than those
of national champions in Europe. The US government, under the Clinton
administration, paved the way for it in 1993 and subsequently actively promoted it
by the non-application of the anti-trust law on the one hand and through financial help
on the other (Scherpenberg, 1996). Up until the end of 1997, the administration
subsidized seven consolidation arrangements to the value of $1.5 billion, which
represented more than half the restructuring costs incurred by the companies
concerned. The administration brought an end to the restructuring process in 1998,
when it announced its opposition to the merger of Lockheed Martin and Northrop
Grumman, citing concerns about the consequences of such a deal for competition
(Schmitt, 2001).
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European Reactions
The interactions between the defence industry response to these trends (supply side) and
the national and supranational political initiatives at the European level (demand side)
have changed the structure of Europe’s defence industry from a large number of small,
distinct contractors (primarily for domestic, national supply) to a continent-wide industrial
base dominated by three major defence companies.
Supply Side
The defence companies’ strategies in facing these trends have been characterized by two
fundamental features: concentration and internationalization.
In the post-Cold War period, the rate of concentration has increased significantly among
Europe’s largest defence companies.1 Concentration has become an essential means of
reducing duplication, pooling resources devoted to research and development and
increasing market shares, and to reach a critical size to sustain the financial investment that
is necessary in the modern defence industry (Schmitt, 2000). The process of increasing
concentration through mergers and acquisitions happened at different speeds depending on
the country and the sector. While it has hardly begun in land systems and naval
shipbuilding, it is far advanced in aerospace and defence electronics (Pandraud, 1996).
The strategies of consolidation have also differed across Europe, some being limited to the
national defence infrastructure, others reaching major cross-border ties through
transnational mergers.2
Internationalization inside Europe has been the other dominant element of its post-Cold
War industrial transformation. The basic forms of internationalization have included
gaining a foothold in other European countries by purchasing local companies,
cooperating with consortiums in order to implement international programmes, and
creating alliances to form European entities based on a structural programme. Because of
its very specific nature and the many resultant political obstacles, internationalization of
the defence industry in Europe had for long been limited to cooperation among national
actors on specific programmes (Kopacˇ, 2006). However, under the pressure of the
post-Cold War changing environment, some of these projects have led to lasting alliances
and transnational joint ventures across the continent.
Demand Side
On the demand side, the restructuring of Europe’s defence industrial base has been
encouraged by the political efforts to improve European armaments cooperation. After the
collapse of the bipolar order, the fragmentary nature of the European defence market,
consisting as it did of various national procurement processes, constituted a barrier to
achieving the lengths of production runs and economies of scale that were requisite to
render integration of the defence industry economically feasible (Keohane, 2002). In the
early 1990s, efforts to create a single European armaments agency were not successful.
Instead, with the goal of harmonizing arms procurement within Europe, an array of ad hoc
arrangements has developed: the Conference of National Armaments Directors within
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the Western European Armaments Group and the
Western European Armaments Organization within the Western European Union; the
Working Group on Armaments Policy (or POLARM) was established after the creation
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of the ESDP; the Joint Armaments Co-operation Organization was created in 1996 by
France, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy; and the ‘Letter of Intent to Facilitate the
Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry’ between the six major
arms-producing countries.3 In 2003, the European Commission published the report
European Defence – Industrial and Market Issues: Towards an EU Defence Equipment
Policy which stressed the importance of creating a genuine European defence market and
proposed several measures “to encourage industrial restructuring and consolidation”
(European Commission, 2003a, p. 12).
This increased institutional cooperation and designing aimed at coordinating the
demand side of Europe’s defence market has resulted, in 2004, in the creation of the
European Defence Agency (EDA).
The Role of the EDA
The Council of the European Union established the EDA ‘to support the Member States
and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of
crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy’.4 Within that
overall mission are four specific functions: developing defence capabilities; promoting
defence research and technology; promoting armaments cooperation; creating a
competitive European defence equipment market and strengthening the European
defence, technological and industrial base. In 2006, the EDA Steering Board agreed a
roadmap and a timetable to produce a comprehensive Capability Development Plan
(EDA, 2006). Its aim is to help EU governments identify the key capability areas that they
must work together to develop in order to meet existing security threats and to target
possible areas for collaboration to deliver the necessary capabilities. The three areas most
relevant for collaborative procurement are: (1) Interoperability, to be achieved through
greater commonality of equipment and systems and shared capabilities; (2) Rapid
Acquisition, in particular quicker exploitation of new technology; and (3) Industrial
Policy, especially to increase investment, consolidate the European technological and
industrial base, and to target the strategic industrial capacities that have to be preserved or
developed.
Interestingly, the EDA has now been included in the Lisbon Treaty as a key
institution in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Its inclusion having
been projected in the failed Constitutional Treaty, the new Treaty explicitly endorses the
duties of the EDA, thereby giving it a solid legal basis and, since it makes no reference
to the other EU agencies, affords to it an unusually high degree of importance
(Sempere, 2008). The Agency’s main tasks are detailed in section 1 of Article 28 D,
which reads as follows:
Promote harmonization of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible
procurement methods; propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms
of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by
member states and management of specific cooperation programmes; support
defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and
the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; contribute to
identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening
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the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the
effectiveness of military expenditure.
The Treaty also assigns the Agency a significant role in matters relating to ‘permanent
structured cooperation’, a modality of cooperation involving member states which seek to
integrate their defence capabilities. Accordingly, with the recent ratification of the Lisbon
Treaty, the role of the EDA will be increasingly pivotal for the future of the European
defence industrial base.
The 1990s Consolidation Process
As a result of the post-Cold War trends in the defence sector, the interactions between
supply and demand have led to a European industry structure with three dominant
players overall and a number of relatively smaller players in particular segments. The big
three are today BAE Systems, EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space
Company) and THALES (formerly Thomson–CSF). Figure 2 illustrates the
consolidation process in the European defence industry during the 1990s.5 Some
of the relatively smaller players are Finmeccanica of Italy and Rolls-Royce of the
United Kingdom.
The current state of the defence market in Europe has been described as a
‘European spaghetti bowl’ (Vlachos-Dengler, 2002). This label refers to the
post-consolidation ownership structure of the European armaments industry, with
innumerable cross-shareholdings, segments and programme-specific joint ventures,
consortia and other legal arrangements. Despite this complex picture, the three big players
constitute the poles around which most European defence activity revolves because they
are involved in almost all major segments of the European defence market (Figure 3).
Through these mergers and acquisitions, as Terrence Guay puts it, ‘the Europeans
have formed defence titans that can finally match their U.S. counterparts’
(Guay, 2005, p. 6).
Figure 2. Consolidation of European industrial base. Source: Schmitt (2000).
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The Space Sector and Transatlantic Industrial Relations
As previously mentioned, the consolidation process of Europe’s defence industry has
proceeded at different speeds depending on the country and the sector. We shall here focus
on the space sector – where the consolidation has been the most advanced – to assess how
the interactions between the demand and the supply sides in Europe have influenced the
political economy of the transatlantic relationship.
The Rise of a European Space Policy
On the demand side, the consolidation of Europe’s space industrial base has been spurred
by the moves towards a supranational space policy in the last decade. Although the earliest
calls for a European space policy date back to 1988 (European Commission, 1988), a
significant first step was made in 2000, when the ‘Wise Men’s Group’ called for a much
stronger link between the European Union and the European Space Agency (ESA) to help
integrate a common European space policy (Bildt et al., 2000).6 Greater momentum was
reached with the White Paper process on European space policy, in 2003, which led to
increased cooperation between the ESA and the European Commission (EC). This process
was instrumental in bringing political and industrial stakeholders around the issue of how
to increase the relevance of space in Europe (Mazurelle et al., 2009). In 2007, the EC,
Figure 3. Ownership structure of European armaments industry. Source: Schmitt (2000).
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together with the Director General of the ESA, adopted the European Space Policy (ESP)
which formalized the first European common space policy and highlighted the importance
of the space sector as a strategic asset for the independence, security and prosperity of
Europe. The document stresses that ‘the strong industrial base existing in Europe . . . must
be maintained and/or reinforced if Europe is to exercise its freedom of initiative in the
space sector’ (Bildt et al. 2004; European Commission, 2003b, pp. 12–13). As a
consequence, the EC, the ESA and the EDA have being increasingly cooperating ‘to
develop critical space technologies in Europe [in order] to ensure that Europe can rely on a
technical and industrial capacity for accessing space’.7 The 2008 ‘Resolution on the
European Space Policy’ of the European ‘Space Council’ is based on the ESP and confirms
its most important points as common political and industrial aims.
Accordingly, a common space policy has gradually emerged at the supranational level
and its institutionalization has gone hand in hand with calls for greater consolidation of
Europe’s space industries.
Major Actors in the European Space Industry
On the supply side, the previously described post-ColdWar trends, paralleled by the rise of
a European space policy, have spurred a far-reaching consolidation of Europe’s space
industry through joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions. This consolidation process has
sharply reduced the number of players in the European space industry and has resulted in
two dominant companies.
. EADS Astrium is the leader in the space market in both the commercial and
military segments. Astrium is Europe’s largest space company in terms of sales
and the third-largest operator in the global space segment behind Lockheed
Martin and Boeing.8 It is today wholly owned by EADS.9
. Thales Alenia Space is a joint venture between Thales (67 per cent) and
Finmeccanica (33 per cent). It was born after Thales bought the participation of
Alcatel in the two joint ventures between Alcatel and Finmeccanica (Alcatel
Alenia Space and Telespazio). Alcatel Alenia Space was established in 2005 by
the merger of Alcatel Space and Alenia Spazio and was owned by Alcatel-Lucent
(67 per cent) and Finmeccanica (33 per cent). Telespazio Holding was a merger of
Finmeccanica and Alcatel businesses (Telespazio and Alcatel’s Space Services
and Operations respectively). In 2006 Alcatel agreed to sell its share of Alcatel
Alenia Space (and its 33 per cent share of Telespazio) to the Thales Group.
Changing Transatlantic Industrial Landscape
The consolidation of Europe’s space industry and the rise of these two dominant players
have transformed the transatlantic industrial landscape. Although the US maintains a
dominant position in the world defence market, Europe’s industrial base has gradually
been able to erode that pre-eminence in the space sector in terms of market shares and
satellite orders.
The 2001 European Commission report Space Industry Developments highlights the
changing transatlantic distribution of orders in the space sector (European Commission,
2001). It shows the progress made by European industry in the late 1990s, when the bulk of
the consolidation process was taking place, culminating in winning more and more orders
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than their US rivals (Figure 4). The transatlantic distribution of market shares of
communication satellites follows a similar pattern (Figure 5). While US space companies
experienced a substantial decline in global market shares during the 1990s, their European
competitors expanded their position in the market. US market share dropped from
84 per cent in the mid 1990s, to 79 per cent at the end of the decade, to 65 per cent
in the period 2000–2006. In the same periods, Europe’s share grew from 9 per cent to
11 per cent, and finally 23 per cent in 2002–2006 (US Department of Commerce, 2007).
Similarly, in the segment of geosynchronous orbit (GEO) satellites, we see that, despite a
continued US relative pre-eminence, the trend during the past two decades has been
Figure 4. European vs. US orders in the space sector. Source: European Commission (2001).
Figure 5. EU–US market shares. Source: US Department of Commerce (2007).
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towards a gradual erosion of US market shares with a growing weight of its European
competitors (Table 1).
These trends do not mean that Europe’s space industry has the capacity yet to replace
US companies’ dominant position in the market, but rather that a redistribution of relative
market power is taking place, with EADS Astrium and Thales Alenia Space becoming the
two most significant competitors for American contractors (Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 2006). As the Department of Commerce puts it, in the report Defence
Industrial Base Assessment: U.S. Space Industry, ‘the US industry now faces strong and
growing competition, primarily from European firms, and is losing market share in allied
countries’ (US Department of Commerce, 2007, p. x). Similarly, a report from the Centre
for International and Strategic Studies explains that the ‘determined effort by European
governments to become more competitive in the space market through mergers and
collaboration has reduced USmarket share. Europe’s effort to consolidate its space firms
[made] them a more effective competitor with the US’ (Lewis & Schlather, 2003, p. 4–5).
Conclusion
In the context of the economic and technological transformations of Europe’s post-Cold
War environment, the interplay between the defence industry response to these trends and
the European political initiatives in the defence realm has transformed the structure of
Europe’s industrial base. The consolidation process of the 1990s has led to an increasingly
robust and competitive defence market dominated by a few companies. In the space
segment, where the consolidation has been the most far-reaching, the two major European
players – EADSAstrium and Thales Alenia Space – have been able to gradually erode US
pre-eminence. As a consequence, the political economy of the transatlantic relationship
has been transformed and has experienced a shift of relative market power across the
Atlantic towards Europe.
Notes
1 See Concentration in the Arms Industry, Stockholm Institute for International Peace, available online at:
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/researchissues/concentration_aprod.






United States Boeing Co. 31% 20%
Lockheed Martin 22% 17%
Space Systems/Loral 14% 17%
Orbital Sciences Corp. 1% 4%
Europe Alcatel Alenia Space 11% 16%
EADS 8% 12%
Russia NPO Prikladnoi Mekhaniki 5% 8%
India ISRO 1% 1%
Total 94% 96%
Total US 68% 58%
Total Europe 19% 28%
Source: Institute for Defense Analysis (2007).
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2 BAE Systems and EADS, for instance, have adopted different strategies of consolidation. BAE Systems
is the result of the consolidation of much of the UK’s national defence infrastructure into one company,
without any major cross-border ties. EADS, on the other hand, was formed via a transnational ‘merger
of mergers’ within similar sectors by the ‘national champions’ of individual countries (Callum & Guay,
2002).
3 Available online at: http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/loisign.html.
4 Available online at: http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/loisign.html.
5 For further details, see Appendices A and B.
6 The so-called ‘Wise Men’s Groups’ was a committee set up to examine the organization of the public
space sector in Europe and the role of ESA in that sector. Its members were: Carl Bildt, former Swedish
prime minister and UN envoy to the Balkans; Jean Peyrelevade, president of Credit Lyonnais; and
Lothar Spa¨th, CEO of Jenoptik and former prime minister of the State Baden-Wurttemberg.
7 EC, ESA, EDA, Workshop on Critical Space Technologies for European Strategic Non-Dependence,
Brussels, 9 September 2008, available online at: http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id¼413.
8 http://www.defence-data.com.
9 In 2002, BAE Systems agreed to sell its 25 per cent stake in the Astrium satellite joint venture to EADS.
References
Adams, G. et al. (1999) Europe’s Defence Industry: A Transatlantic Future? (London: Centre for European
Reform).
Aviation Week & Space Technology (2006) Aerospace Source Book 2006 (New York: Aviation Week & Space
Technology).
Bildt, C., Peyrelevade, J. & Spa¨th, L. (2000) Towards a space agency for the European Union, Report for the
Director-General of the European Space Agency, November.
Bildt, C. et al. (2004) Europe in Space (London: Centre for European Reform).
Callum, R. & Guay, T. (2002) The transformation and future prospects of Europe’s defense industry,
International Affairs, 78(4), pp. 757–776.
European Commission (1988) The European Community and space: a coherent approach, Communication from
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(88) 417 final.
European Commission (2001) Space Industry Developments in 2000, Report no. 150601, 15 June.
European Commission (2003a) European defence – industrial and market issues: towards an EU defence
equipment policy, COM (2003), 11 March.
European Commission (2003b) Green Paper: European space policy, COM(2007) 212, 28 April.
European Defence Agency (2006) An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity,
endorsed by the Steering Board, 3 October.
Grant, C. (1999) Transatlantic alliances and the revolution in military affairs, in: G. Adams et al. (Ed.)
Europe’s Defence Industry: A Transatlantic Future? pp. 63–69 (London: Centre for European Reform).
Guay, T. (1998) At Arm’s Length: The European Union and Europe’s Defence Industry (Houndmills, UK:
Macmillan).
Hayward, K. (1999) The globalisation of the defence business, in: G. Adams et al. (Ed.) Europe’s Defence
Industry: A Transatlantic Future? pp. 8–15 (London: Centre for European Reform).
Institute for Defense Analysis (2007) Export controls and the US defense industrial base, January.
Kenny, B. (1999) Change and crossborder activity in the European defence industry, European Business Review,
99(2), pp. 115–124.
Keohane, D. (2002) The EU and Armaments Co-operation (London: Centre for European Reform).
Kopacˇ, E. (2006) Defense industry restructuring: trends in European and US defense companies,
Transition Studies Review, 13(2), pp. 283–296.
Laird, R. (1999) The inevitability of global defence industry alliances, in: G. Adams et al. (Ed.) Europe’s Defence
Industry: A Transatlantic Future? pp. 55–62 (London: Centre for European Reform).
Lewis, J. & Schlather, E. (2003) US Share of the Communications Satellite Market (Centre for Strategic and
International Studies), Washington DC.
Mazurelle, F., Wouters, J. & Thiebaut, W. (2009) The evolution of European space governance: policy, legal and
institutional implications, International Organizations Law Review, 6(1), pp. 155–189.
Murawiec, L. (1998) La re´volution dans les affaires militaires aux Etats-Unis: puissance de l’innovation,
De´fense nationale, July, 21(83), pp. 743–754.
Post-Cold War Trends in the European Defence Industry 73
O’Keefe, S. (1998) The Defence Industry in the Post-Cold War Era (Pergamon), New York.
Pandraud, R. (1996) L’Europe et son industrie ae´rospatiale, Report 3219, European Union Delegation,
National Assembly, Paris.
Scherpenberg, J. (1996) Transatlantic competition and the European defence industries – a new look at the
trade-defence linkage, ESAN-Projekt: Arms Production and Cooperation, SWP-AP 2992, December.
Schmitt, B. (2000) From Cooperation to integration: defence and aerospace industries in Europe, EU-ISS Chaillot
Paper no. 40, July.
Schmitt, B. (2001) Between cooperation and competition: the transatlantic defence market, EU-ISS Chaillot
Papers no. 44, January.
Sempere, C. (2008) The European Defence Agency in the wake of the Treaty of Lisbon, Real Instituto Elcano,
ARI 33, 11 April.
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation (2007)
Defence industrial base assessment: US space industry, Final Report, August 31.
Vlachos-Dengler, K. (2002) From National Champions to European Heavyweights. The Development of
European Defence Capabilities across Market Segments (RAND Corporation), Santa-Monica, California.















































Post-Cold War Trends in the European Defence Industry 75
Appendix B. Big Three Post-Cold War Consolidation
Figure A.2. Post-Cold War consolidation: BAE systems. Source: Stockholm Institute for
International Peace.
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Figure A.3. Post-Cold War consolidation: EADS. Source: Stockholm Institute for International
Peace.
Figure A.4. Post-Cold War consolidation: Thales. Source: Stockholm Institute for International
Peace.
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